One year after the fall of the Assad regime and Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s dramatic rise to power, Syria continues to face existential questions: How will Syria confront the dangers of division, economic collapse, Israeli occupation, civil war, and terrorism? These risks are not, of course, independent of one another; rather, they are intertwined and feed into one another. These risks became apparent one day after the arrival of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham forces and allied factions in Damascus. Do these risks still exist today? Have they decreased or increased? What is the new president’s policy for addressing these risks? And most importantly, will Syria survive, and how will it do so?
Are the risks real?
Some want to portray these risks as minor or exaggerated, arguing that Syria has overcome the most dangerous phase with the departure of the Assad regime. It is therefore imperative to assess these risks scientifically.
First, division: This risk does not seem remote or imaginary, but rather an expression of a reality that is taking shape on the ground. The demands for secession in Suwayda, the stalled negotiations between the government in Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the areas in the north under Turkish influence, and the absence of a unified Syrian national army that brings all these forces together, confirm that Syria is experiencing a state of “de facto division.”
The issue of division is also exacerbated by inflammatory rhetoric and sharp polarization on social media, which has become a platform for incitement and exclusion. This digital polarization deepens sub-identities at the expense of a shared national identity, while preventing the building of the necessary trust for any genuine reconciliation.
This danger is a reality, not a future threat. This danger can only be countered by forming a unified Syrian national army that is a unifying national institution, free from sectarian, regional, or narrow political loyalties, that protects the sovereignty and integrity of the land by launching genuine and serious negotiations — not only on powers and authorities — between the capital and the periphery. Any solution to the division must be based on the recognition that the country is the responsibility of all and for all.
Second, the Israeli occupation: This danger is no longer a possibility, but rather, confirmed by the facts on the ground. Netanyahu did not hesitate to destroy what remained of the Syrian army, one day after Assad’s fall. Nor did he hesitate to occupy more Syrian territory, including areas of the periphery of Damascus and Quneitra, reiterating his desire for a demilitarized south and a corridor to Suwayda, and his categorical refusal to return to the 1974 agreement. Moreover, he did not hesitate to bomb the General Staff Headquarters, the area surrounding the Presidential Palace, and Syrian army convoys, with Israel’s air force moving across the length and breadth of the country. This is another danger that is not a possibility, but a reality on the ground.
Third, economic collapse: It is no secret that one of the reasons for the collapse of the Assad regime was the severe economic sanctions imposed on it by the West. Although a significant portion of these sanctions has already been lifted, the Caesar Act, which has had the most impact on the country and its economy, continues to weigh heavily on the Syrian economy. Recent news from Washington, D.C., indicates that a complete suspension of the Caesar Act could take place at the end of the year.
Even if the Caesar Act is lifted soon, its effects will remain for a long time, and it will not be easy for the authorities and society to deal with them. What’s more, the Syrian economy is suffering from fundamental structural imbalances, manifested in the total collapse of the national currency and an unprecedented wave of inflation that has undermined citizens’ purchasing power. Key productive sectors, such as industry and agriculture, have also experienced a sharp decline due to destruction and a lack of investment and energy, at a time when administrative and institutional chaos has accumulated, hindering any efforts at reform or reconstruction. These crises have been exacerbated by chronic structural problems, such as the collapse of the electricity and energy network and the infrastructure needed to restart the economy, as well as the catastrophic drought that has hit the vital agricultural sector and threatened the country’s water and food security. The current economic landscape is therefore the cumulative result of these internal pressures combined with external sanctions, which means that even after the sanctions are lifted, recovery will remain dependent on addressing these internal root causes and rebuilding infrastructure and economic confidence. Once again, this is not a potential risk but a reality on the ground.
Fourth, civil war: If we rely on academic definitions, what is happening in Syria is nothing but a civil war, and Syria is still in the conflict stage and not in the post-conflict stage. The fighting between the Bedouins and the Druze, followed by battles between government forces and Druze factions on the one hand, led to serious violations and massacres of Druze civilians. This was preceded by an attack by forces linked to remnants of the former regime on public security forces on the coast, followed by attacks by factions that led to massacres of Alawite civilians. The state of no peace and no war between the government in Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continues, confirming that the roots of the civil conflict are still smoldering and that the country is still reeling from the civil war. Once again, this is not a potential danger, but a reality on the ground.
However, emerging from this dark tunnel requires more than just a cessation of fighting. Any genuine path toward peace and stability cannot be achieved without establishing a comprehensive and genuine national dialogue process, which includes all Syrian actors [zA1] and addresses the root causes of the political and social crisis. Building lasting peace is also intrinsically linked to achieving transitional justice, which is not limited to criminal justice, but also includes uncovering the truth, compensating victims, and ensuring that violations are not repeated. In the case of Syria, this begins even before the fall of the regime. The absence of these mechanisms fuels the cycle of violence and undermines any effort to restore social cohesion and build citizens’ confidence in a shared future.
Fifth, terrorism: This threat is exacerbated by the remarkable resurgence of ISIS activity in 2024. The organization’s attacks increased by 250% compared to the previous year, taking advantage of the chaos that accompanied the release of detainees on the one hand, and the ongoing disintegration of the country on the other hand. The number of ISIS members in Syria is estimated at around 2,000-2,500, distributed in small groups that launch attacks on both the SDF and government forces, especially in the Badia regions, specifically in the countryside of Deir ez-Zor in what is known as the Bermuda Triangle: Al-Basira, Jabal al-Bashri, Al-Sukhnah, and Diban in Deir ez-Zor. This is not a potential threat, but a reality on the ground.
What is worrying is not only the existence of these factors, but also their intense interconnection and mutual influence, which creates a vicious cycle that threatens the country. The manifestations of civil war perpetuate the de facto division, and the dilapidated economy fuels all forms of conflict. In addition, the drought threatening the already devastated countryside is causing young people to migrate to cities, raising unemployment to unprecedented levels and leading to a youth boom (estimates indicate that Syria is facing a youth boom around 2030), turning young people into a ticking time bomb fueled by sectarian conflicts, a dilapidated economy, and foreign interference, creating a perfect storm capable of blowing the country apart.
Al-Shara’s foreign and domestic policy towards stability
Al-Sharaa believes that the most important factor for stability is the relationship with the regional and international community. In all of this, the United States appears to be the cornerstone of this approach. The domestic fronts depend on the Americans for almost everything. The revival of the economy depends on the lifting of US sanctions, ending Israeli attacks depends on American mediation, mediation with the SDF is in the hands of the United States, mediation with the Druze factions is in the hands of America (and Jordan), and fighting terrorism requires balanced American support, both in terms of intelligence and in carrying out the operations themselves.
By ‘the outside world,’ this also includes the expectation that the United States lifts economic and UN sanctions, remove terrorism-related designations, and refrain from vetoing Syria’s efforts to build relations with China and Russia.
All of this means that the US, or rather Trump, is the cornerstone of Al-Sharaa’s policy. Al-Sharaa certainly seeks to balance the US role through positive relations with Russia and Europe on the one hand, Turkey on the other, and Saudi Arabia and the Arabs in general on the third. However, these relations all remain within the framework of a relatively supportive and balancing role, if you will, and do not constitute a decisive factor, except for Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which are key players in supporting Al-Sharaa’s efforts to bring Syria back into the international community after it was completely isolated during the years of the revolution. However, this balancing act means nothing if Trump’s policy changes, making the relationship with Trump the only bet. If it fails, Syria will go to unprecedented hell.
As for the Damascus government’s domestic policy, despite its overlap with foreign policy, it also has its own distinctive features. The government seeks to improve services in city centers in general and in the major cities of Damascus and Aleppo in particular. Sanitation, improving the appearance of cities, and improving the electricity supply are all part of the government’s efforts to improve the environment, attract investment, and raise societal satisfaction, particularly in urban areas. It also seeks to build a broad network of Syrian economists, whether they are economists who opposed the Assad regime, those who supported it, or even those who were part of its system, in a remarkable exercise of political realism that seeks to compensate for the country’s collapsing economy. However, the economic policy discernible from its initial features is moving towards a free-market economy, and perhaps a harsh one that may expose the poor to further poverty and marginalization.
Al-Sharaa also seeks to build with civil society groups, without politics. All of Al-Sharaa’s meetings so far have not included any political parties or movements but have been limited to meetings with clerics and representatives of sects and groups, with the exception of the Syrian Democratic Forces, of course. All party meetings appear to be unwelcome, amid rumors that he wants to build his own political party, following the passage of a new law on political parties. The government compensates for all this by allowing reasonable space for civil society, with significant variations between provinces that would enable work in some areas and hinder it in others. Despite this openness towards civil society, the authorities have sought to draw civil society into government circles to win it over to their side, while keeping humanitarian institutions as the most prominent players in civil society, in an effort to control civil society in some way.
When it comes to governance, it is clear that local governance plays an important role in the Damascus government’s approaches, both in terms of managing local service files and in terms of relations with the SDF and other parties. There is significant delegation of authority to governors, many of whom come from the governorate itself, to allow the authorities in Damascus to rebuild the center. This was certainly not a consistent policy from the moment the new government took charge, but was reinforced after the success of local fundraising campaigns such as Abshari Horan, Wafa Idlib, Deir al-Az, and others, while the Development Fund campaigns did not enjoy the same success. In addition, there is a tendency to unify the security and service tracks in administrative divisions with important delegations of authority to officials in the provinces and regions, in an effort to improve the level of decentralization after decades of extreme centralization.
In short, the current transitional government’s policy appears to be one of reliance on the US, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, both externally and internally, with policies of opening up the economy, maintaining social freedoms in a balance between conservative and liberal society, and closing off politics, in an approach that seems similar to the situation in the region in general, and in the Gulf in particular, with one fundamental difference: the Gulf has a booming economy, while Syria must wait a long time or be patient for a long time, literally walking on the edge of a precipice rather than on its edge, to see the light…
Zedoun AlZoubi is an Associate Fellow at IFI.
